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Claims of Religious Morality: 
 The Limits of Religious Freedom in International Human Rights Law 
Alison Mawhinney*  
 
 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is not a constant. As human rights 
law has progressively acquired a conceptual status as a means of reconciling tensions, the 
substantive legal content of the right to freedom to manifest religion or belief has widened. 
This paper argues that the admittance of claims of religious morality within this expanded 
understanding of the right exposes the conceptual imprecision underlying the right and 
presents a complex challenge to human rights supervisory bodies to address such claims 
without undermining their founding objectives. The first part of the paper traces the historical 
treatment of the right to freedom of religion or belief as a means of understanding its 
evolving and multifaceted nature. Part II draws on this overview to develop a taxonomy of 
aspects of the right and, in particular, it suggests that claims of religious morality ought to be 
viewed and treated as a distinct facet. The final part of the paper examines a group of recent 
cases before the European Court of Human Rights to explore current judicial responses to 
such claims and considers the risks posed by claims of religious morality for the 
contemporary right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  
 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
The contestable nature of human rights is nowhere more exposed than in the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion. The lack of an agreed philosophical underpinning to the 
idea of human rights is mirrored and magnified in discussions around the rationale for a right 
to freedom of religion or belief in human rights law.1  A right can live in the absence of a 
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coherent justification for its existence. However, when the issues involving it become 
increasingly complex there is a need for a fuller agreement as to what the right entails, even if 
this does not reach a consensus on the reason for its being. There is, after all, a limit as to 
how much obscuration a court can employ in its interpretation and treatment of the right 
without fatally damaging the freedom itself and the wider concept of human rights.  
A number of recent claims by religious individuals for the protection and 
accommodation of their beliefs, values, and practices has challenged the European Court of 
Human Rights to tackle the conceptual imprecision surrounding the right to freedom of 
religion or belief found in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).2  
In some instances, the Court has taken the opportunity to clarify its understanding of the 
scope of the right, and to develop its approach to discerning unjustified interferences with 
religious freedom. However, the Court has also revealed internal fundamental disagreement 
over the basic framework of the article and a continuing discomfort with its role in 
establishing the norms and demarcating the limits of religious freedom in international human 
rights law. This unease is particularly marked in cases dealing with what have sometimes 
been called claims of conscience where an individual believes they are required by law to act 
in a manner contrary to religion. These claims, for example, may relate to views on marriage, 
abortion, or homosexuality where the view of the claimant finds itself in conflict with the 
prevailing legislation treating the issue. In the following discussions claims of this nature are 
referred to as claims of religious morality or, more precisely, as claims stemming from a facet 
of religion that may be described as “religion as a moral informant.”   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 For a discussion of these issues, see, for example, Tom Lewis, What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the 
European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation, 56 I.C.L.Q. 395 (2007); see also CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM 
OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2003).  
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  
 art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol 3, Sept. 21, 1970, Eur. T.S No. 45, Protocol 5, 
Dec. 20, 1971, Eur. T.S. No. 55 and Protocol 8, Jan. 1, 1990, Eur. T.S No 118.  (hereinafter ECHR). 
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Claims arising from “religion as a moral informant” pose significant challenges for 
the Court. Its first concern is to consider whether claims of religious morality should fall 
within the scope of Article 9—an unenviable task given the underlying uncertainty as to what 
the Court ought to be protecting under a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
In the absence of a conceptual underpinning to the right, Part 1 of the paper aims to 
contribute to a more detailed understanding of its scope through an historical overview of the 
treatment of religious freedom. The account illustrates the evolving and multifaceted nature 
of the freedom but, nevertheless, demonstrates that, historically, individual claims of morality 
have not been an aspect of religious liberty protected by international law.  
Part II assesses whether the contemporary formulation of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief found in Article 9 of the Convention should embrace claims of religious 
morality. It develops the work of Jeremy Gunn in forming a taxonomy of aspects or facets of 
religion or belief, drawing on the historical account in the first part of the paper to provide 
instances when these facets may have received legal protection in the past. It then traces to 
what extent these various facets are offered contemporary protection by Article 9 and 
considers the options for admitting and assessing claims of religious morality within the 
inherent limits of human rights law.  
The third and final part of the paper assesses the recent approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights to claims of religious morality and, in particular, claims of unjustified 
treatment and dismissal from employment because of a refusal to provide services to 
homosexuals. It takes as a case study the judgment of Eweida and Others v. the United 
Kingdom and examines the reasoning of the Court through the framework of the taxonomy 
and assessment provided in Part II. The analysis suggests that a more precise understanding 
of the relationship between this aspect of religious freedom—“religion as a moral informant” 
—and the right to freedom of religion or belief would allow for a more appropriate response 
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from the Court. The paper concludes with a consideration of the risks posed by claims of 
religious morality for the contemporary right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF A MULTI-FACETED FREEDOM 
Religious freedom has been of concern to individuals, states and the international community 
throughout much of history. A striking feature of this concern has been its variability in terms 
of the rationale for protection, the recipient of the protection, and the means of realising that 
protection. A review of the historical development of the protection of religious freedom 
serves as a reminder and illustration of the flexible and changing nature of rights where 
formulations of a right are shaped in response to changing ideologies and changing political 
priorities. Tom Hadden argues that these influences have caused a continual and, at times, 
cyclical progression in the development of rights.3  He notes that rights and concerns 
associated with minorities, such as religious freedom, “have been subject to what may be 
called a pendulum effect; that from time to time the focus of attention has shifted from 
individual to group rights and back again rather like a pendulum.”4 The position of the 
pendulum has important implications for how religious freedom is understood and for how 
claims for the protection and accommodation of religion or belief are treated by law.  
The origins of concern for religious freedom in the modern state system can be traced 
to the development of the idea of religious toleration following the wars of religion in 
seventeenth-century Europe. The acceptance of diversity in religious belief was initially “a 
fact which the emerging international community had to accommodate, rather than a 
                                                          
3 Tom Hadden, The Pendulum Theory of Individual, Communal and Minority Rights, 3 CRITICAL REV. INT'L 
SOC. & POL. POL'Y 77 (2000). 
4 Id. at 81. 
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principle which it sought to uphold.”5  Gradually religious freedom also came to be 
connected to the idea of conscience but, as Julian Rivers notes, relief to conscience was 
initially provided on a group, rather than individual, basis leading to legal exemptions being 
provided to certain religious groups, “freeing them from obligations to engage in uniform 
public worship.”6  This, he observes, necessitated distinguishing between acceptable and 
unacceptable dissent. The eighteenth-century philosopher, George Berkeley, expressed this 
dilemma at the time in a question posed in his work, The Querist: “Whether every plea of 
conscience is to be regarded? Whether, for instance, the German Anabaptists, Levellers, or 
Fifth Monarchy men would be tolerated on that pretence?”7  His question not only highlights 
that the focus at this time was on selecting which groups ought to be awarded an exception 
from such duties but also that the concern was to grant exemptions to groups rather than to 
individuals.  
Following this period when the emphasis was placed on group rights, the pendulum 
swung to a concern with the rights of the individual. Hadden suggests that the focus on 
individual rights reflects the influence of the prevailing political and economic theories in 
which “individuals were thought to be independent actors who made their own political, 
social and economic contracts.”8  This shift finds expression in national law rather than in any 
international treaty. For example, the American Declaration of Independence expresses the 
eighteenth-century concern for freedom of religion of the individual in the First Amendment: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”  While the phrase freedom of conscience is not used in the Amendment it is 
                                                          
5 Malcolm Evans, Religious Liberty and Non-Discrimination, in NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 119, 122 (Titia Loenen ed., 1999).  
6 Julian Rivers, The Secularisation of the British Constitution, 14(3) ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 371, 388 (2012). 
7 JOSEPH JOHNSTON, BISHOP BERKELEY’S QUERIST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 182 (1970). Berkeley’s work 
attempted to interrogate the social issues of the time by posing a series of questions and, as Joseph Johnston 
remarked, for Berkeley, “To formulate the right question was for him a long step in the direction of its 
ascertainment,” id. at 5.  
8 Hadden, supra note 3, at 82. 
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widely accepted that the “then-contemporary Protestant conception of freedom of conscience 
underlies these two clauses,”9 albeit with differing opinions on whether the resulting right 
ought to be interpreted as giving the individual the right to choose her religion or belief in 
order to avoid the danger of coercion, or whether a better interpretation is to understand the 
right as a right to exercise a duty according to the dictates of conscience.10   
During the nineteenth century, with the influence of sociology and socialism, the 
individualist focus on rights gave way to an approach that focused on national, class, and 
group rights, and a need for their protection in international law.11  In the case of religious 
freedom, attention centered on the religious minorities of Central and Eastern Europe where 
territorial settlements were made conditional on states respecting the religious freedom of 
particular groups within their borders.12  The Minorities Treaty (1919) became the prototype 
for many of the bilateral minority treaties of the inter-war years that aimed to identify and 
offer protection to religious groups left vulnerable by the terms of political settlements.13  It 
provided a framework that aimed to protect religious minorities from discrimination as well 
as to guarantee their freedom of religion and cultural accommodation. The latter was 
provided for in three layers of increasing relevance and specificity to the particular situation 
pertaining in Poland. First, the free exercise of religion was guaranteed to all inhabitants 
subject only to public order or public morals. Secondly, minority rights were established in 
the areas of language use, the establishment of charitable, religious, educational and social 
                                                          
9 Michael J White, The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses: ‘Freedom of Conscience’ versus Institutional 
Accommodation, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2010).  
10 Michael Sandel, Religious Liberty – Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, 1989 UTAH. L. REV. 
597, 611-12 (1989). In arguing for the latter as a better means of protecting the religious liberty of the 
‘conscientiously encumbered’ individual, Sandel is critical of the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court that has 
favoured the ‘voluntarist’ conception of the right through an application of the principle of neutrality.  
11 Hadden, supra note 3, at 82. 
12 For example, the Treaty of Berlin (1878) which obliged Romania and Serbia—as a condition of their 
recognition—to respect the religious liberties of all citizens and, in particular, those of their Jewish populations. 
See Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of 
Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878, , art. XI, July 13, 1878, 153 Consol. T.S. 171.  




institutions, and in acquiring an equitable share of public funds for their educational, 
religious, and charitable activities. Finally, two specific “Jewish clauses” provided particular 
guarantees for the Jewish community in the areas of education and observance of the 
Sabbath.14 
The precise nature of the provisions crafted to respond to the position of the Jewish 
population in Poland—and the similarly specific content of other minority treaties—was 
possible because, as Malcolm Evans has argued, “the identities of the groups to be protected 
and the nature of the interests in need of protection were clearly identifiable.”15 In such 
situations, the measures necessary to protect religious freedom could be agreed in concrete 
form, albeit after intense negotiation. This had the effect of appearing to offer real and 
generous guarantees of religious freedom and cultural accommodation; these guarantees were 
later to dissolve with tragic consequences.  
Following the events of the Second World War and the associated failure of the 
minority treaty system, the pendulum swung back to individual rights, but this time at an 
international level. An emerging body of international human rights law focused on 
developing general formulations to protect the individual from unjustified state interference. 
It is when the pendulum came to rest at this point that those concerned with freedom of 
religion or belief were faced with the conceptual challenge of considering what an individual 
right to freedom of religion or belief ought to entail and how it ought to be formulated in an 
abstract, non-concrete manner. As Evans notes, discussions around the drafting of the right to 
                                                          
14 See Treaty of Berlin, supra note 12, art. 11 (providing that: “Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act 
which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath,” and included specific reference to attendance at courts of law, 
and elections or registration for electoral or other purposes). 
15 Evans, supra note 5, at 121.  
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freedom of religion or belief in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights16 (UDHR) 
exposed fundamental disagreements: 
[W]hich had previously been masked by the exigencies of the particular situation 
under consideration. For example, the difficulty of defining ‘religion’ or ‘exercise’ 
could be ignored if the primary purpose of a treaty was to ensure that Christians were 
free to attend a church, Jews a synagogue or Muslims a mosque since ensuring 
equality between all religions and the freedom of believers to attend worship was 
quite sufficient. It was unnecessary to be concerned whether it also permitted 
Animists to have access to nature reserves. Such questions do become relevant when a 
right is being defined in the abstract….17 
While the agreed final formulation of the article (Article 18) did reach a consensus on 
a number of important issues,18 it concealed a variety of understandings as to its substantive 
content, including disagreement as to when the right could be legitimately limited. 
Nonetheless, the text and structure of the article gave an indication of the aspects of the 
freedom that should be protected, even if the meaning and scope of those aspects were left 
undefined. It reads: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)19 and 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights drew heavily on the text of Article 
18 UDHR when translating the Declaration’s guarantees into legal obligations.   Article 9 of 
the ECHR provides that: 
                                                          
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).  
17 Evans, supra note 5, at 121.  
18 For example, it was agreed that non-theistic beliefs were to be included within its ambit. 
19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.20 
The first part of Article 9(1) provides an individual with the absolute right to hold 
patterns of thought, conscience and religion of their choosing, and to change their religion or 
belief as they so wish. The remainder of the right provides a right to manifest a religion or 
belief but this right of manifestation is limited to expression through four channels - worship, 
teaching, practice and observance. Furthermore, it is articulated as a qualified right subject to 
a number of limitations as set out in the second paragraph, namely, public order, health, 
morals, and the protection of the rights of others.  
This abstract formulation of an individual right to freedom of religion or belief aims 
to provide a composite of the range of facets of religious freedom deemed worthy of 
protection in previous centuries whilst attempting to limit the nature of the claims that fall 
within its scope. It challenges the European Court of Human Rights to differentiate between 
those aspects of religious freedom that ought to gain protection from Article 9 and those that 
should be recognised as outside its scope. As the brief historical account of the treatment of 
freedom of religion and belief has highlighted, a range of interests has been the object of 
national and international concern at different points in time. Where individual claims of 
conscience have explicitly featured as a right, their manifestation has been protected at a 
national rather than international level.  International law has limited its protection of claims 
                                                          
20 ECHR, supra note 2. 
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of conscience to specific groups, for example, those provisions found in minority treaties that 
permitted Jews to abstain from taking part in activities that would constitute a violation of the 
Sabbath. In Part II a taxonomic approach attempts to sort the differing interests of the 
religious freedom into a number of facets with a view to tracing whether and how a 
contemporary individual human right should accommodate these concerns. In particular, it 
seeks to examine the place of claims of religious morality—historically often referred to as 
claims of conscience—within the formulation of such a right.  
2. A TAXONOMY OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 
In his work on understanding and recognising claims based on the ground of religion within 
the context of persecution and discrimination under refugee law, T. Jeremy Gunn suggests 
that, instead of searching out a definition of religion to assist in identifying such a claim, it is 
more useful to gain an understanding of the different facets of religion.21 He proposes three 
such facets: “Religion as Belief”; “Religion as Identity”; and “Religion as a Way of Life.”  A 
claim may focus on one of these facets or may involve any combination of them. Gunn 
recognises that facets other than those he has identified for his specific purposes are likely to 
exist. The account below develops Gunn’s taxonomy and argues that in understanding 
freedom of religion and belief as an individual human right it is useful to conceive of the 
“Religion as a Way of life” as being comprised of two sub-facets: “Religion as Expected 
Conduct” and “Religion as a Moral Informant.”  It is argued that the latter sub-facet has a 
particular relevance for contemporary claims of religious morality for accommodation, 
namely those where the claimant believes the law requires them to act in a manner which is 
contrary to their religion. 
                                                          
21 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003). 
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Gunn’s first identified facet, “Religion as Belief,” focuses on an individual’s 
attachment and adherence to the truth claims of her belief system. Gunn describes this facet 
as pertaining to:  
[The] convictions that people hold regarding such matters as God, truth or doctrines 
of faith. Belief religion may emphasise, for example, adherence to doctrines such as 
the Nicene Creed, the transmigration of souls, karma, dharma…Belief religion 
typically emphasizes the importance of individuals having a proper understanding of 
doctrines…Although sometimes conflated with so-called “private religion,” belief 
religion may in fact emphasize the critical importance of a religious community of 
like-minded believers, the essential role of a priesthood in the salvation of souls, or 
even the need to manifest religion in the public square. But whether belief religion is 
exhibited by an individual or in a community of believers, it will emphasize the truth 
claims of the religion.22   
“Religion as Belief” is recognised and reflected in historical concerns that were often 
expressed in terms to do with protecting the conscience. From the seventeenth-century, these 
concerns were alleviated through collective legal exemptions given to particular groups in 
society excusing members of these groups from general obligations such as the requirement 
to attend collective public worship according to a prescribed doctrine. This facet is also 
reflected in the provisions of the inter-war minority treaties that provided for the free exercise 
of religion and the establishment of religious institutions. 
From the perspective of human rights law, protecting “Religion as Belief” demands 
recognition of the right to choose one’s own paradigm of thought, conscience and religion, 
and the right not to be forced to adopt (if only formally and superficially) alien truth claims. 
These rights are recognised and protected by Article 9. The right to hold a religion or belief 
of one’s choice is considered by the European Court of Human Rights to fall within the forum 
internum, an area of inner personal belief that is held to be inviolable and absolute, and 
                                                          
22 Id. at 200.  
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protected by the first limb of Article 9(1).23 The Court has rarely considered issues under this 
aspect of the Article. When it has been asked to consider cases concerning an individual’s 
right not to be forced to adopt unwanted truth claims, it has typically chosen to frame the 
claim as a passive right not to be forced to manifest beliefs in a manner contrary to one’s 
beliefs. Hence, for example, it chose to consider a case of compulsory religious oath-taking 
as a violation of Article 9(2), the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.24  Irrespective of 
the mechanism by which claims related to “Religion as Belief” under Article 9 are protected, 
it should be noted that the Court is essentially concerned here with respecting the right of an 
individual to believe in a truth, doctrine, or thought pattern of their choosing. It is not 
concerned with respecting the substantive content of that belief—in other words, the focus is 
on respecting the person rather than the belief. This renders it unnecessary for the Court to 
examine the nature and content of a belief prior to affording the individual the right to choose 
that religion or belief over another.  
The second facet identified by Gunn is “Religion as Identity.”  This facet recognises 
the role of religion as a marker of group identity as opposed to a source of truth claims and 
doctrines: 
[R]eligion as identity emphasizes affiliation with a group. In this sense, identity 
religion is experienced as something akin to family, ethnicity, race, or nationality. 
Identity religion thus is something into which people believe they are born rather than 
something to which they convert after a process of study, prayer, or reflection. 
Identity religion, in this basic form, understands co-religionists to be part of the same 
group (perhaps even regardless of their personal beliefs). Identity religion is less 
likely to emphasize shared theological beliefs and more likely to emphasize shared 
                                                          
23 See, e.g., Van Den Dungen v. the Netherlands, App. No. 22838.93, 80 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 147 
(1995). 
24 Buscarini et al. v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), where new members of the 
Parliament were required to take an oath on the Bible that they would fulfil their duties correctly. 
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histories, cultures, ethnicity and traditions….this affiliation extends even to those who 
may be self-consciously non-religious.25  
The “Religion as Identity” facet of religion was the driver for the protection of 
religious minorities in the late nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, 
especially in situations where religion was tied to ethnic identity. In these instances, though 
not necessarily all, adherence to a particular theology was not the primary impetus for 
persecution of the individual or group. As Gunn notes, “the persecutor does not attack 
because of a disagreement over an interpretation of the Nicene Creed or whether 
enlightenment is best attained through Pure Land or Theravadan Buddhism; the persecutors 
typically attack because they see the religion of the other as part of a threat to their own 
competing identity.”26 
While it is beyond doubt that “Religion as Identity” has been and remains a major 
cause of discrimination, its treatment as an aspect of the Article 9 human right to freedom of 
religion or belief adds little to an understanding of what that right entails. The main non-
discrimination article of the ECHR (Article 14) does not confer a free-standing right but 
rather must be applied in relation to the substantive rights conferred by the other articles in 
the Convention. Hence, the European Court of Human Rights can only consider a case of 
religious discrimination in so far as it relates to one of the substantive guarantees found in 
Article 9.  For this reason, Gwyneth Pitt argues that it is more appropriate to treat this facet of 
religion within the canon of discrimination law through an expanded notion of race and 
ethnicity.27  She commends the approach of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), which recognizes the “Religion as Identity” 
facet through its conception of national minorities in terms of “the essential elements of their 
                                                          
25 Gunn, supra note 21, at 201. 
26 Id. at 203. 
27 Gwyneth Pitt, Religion or Belief: Aiming at the Right Target?, in EQUALITY LAW IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN 
UNION: UNDERSTANDING THE ARTICLE 13 DIRECTIVES 202 (Helen Meenan ed., 2007).  
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identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.”  For Pitt the 
advantage of the Framework Convention’s approach is that:  
[I]t aims not only to protect national minorities from discrimination but also to enable 
them to maintain and develop their own culture and to promote a climate within 
which cultural diversity is recognised as a source of enrichment for society rather than 
being seen as potentially divisive. This approach accurately identifies the central 
problem of religious discrimination and its precepts would provide a better framework 
for dealing with it.28 
While protection of “Religion as Identity” may sit uneasily within the remit of the 
contemporary individual right to freedom of religion or belief, Article 9 of the ECHR has a 
significant role to play in the facilitation of the third facet of religion identified by Gunn, 
namely, “Religion as a Way of Life.”  For Gunn, “Religion as a Way of Life” is: 
[A]nalytically distinct from the previous two but is likely to be tied to one of them in 
the mind of the religious person... In this facet, religion is associated with actions, 
rituals, customs, and traditions that may distinguish the believer from adherents of 
other religions. For example, religion as a way of life may motivate people to live in 
monasteries or religious communities, or to observe many rituals including praying 
five times a day, eschewing the eating of pork or circumcising males…Unlike the 
once weekly attendance at religious ceremonies, religion for these other people affects 
many aspects of their lives that are likely not to be accommodated by the laws of a 
state. Many countries, for example, require military service, which runs afoul of 
pacifists’ strong religious beliefs.29 
From a human rights perspective and that of Article 9, the “Way of Life” facet of 
religion is treated through the notion that an individual has a right to manifest their religion or 
beliefs in worship, teaching, practice and observance, either alone or collectively, and in 
public or in private. Actions that amount to a manifestation may be subjected to limitations. 
However, any interference with an individual’s right in this manner must be justified by the 
                                                          
28 Id. at 227. 
29 Gunn, supra note 21, at 204. 
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state. If the interference cannot be justified, then accommodation must be made to allow the 
individual to manifest their religion in the desired manner. The process of justification 
demands that the state shows that it has met three tests. First, it must show that the restriction 
on the manifestation was “prescribed by law.”  Second, it must show that the restriction was 
imposed in order to protect public safety, public order, health, morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others. Finally, the state must show that the restriction was “necessary in a 
democratic society.” The European Court of Human Rights has held that this test of 
“necessary in a democratic society” requires that the interference corresponds to a “pressing 
social need” and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”30 
Given that the majority of claims related to Article 9 fall under the “Way of Life” 
facet, the question as to what counts as an acceptable form of manifestation of one’s religion 
or belief for the purpose of the right becomes very important.  Carolyn Evans notes that the 
use of specific words without any qualification—“to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance”—suggests that the list of modes of manifestation 
found in Article 9(1) was intended to be exclusive rather than inclusive.31   
Initially, Strasbourg took a narrow interpretation of what constituted an acceptable 
manifestation holding that the Article was concerned with protecting “acts which are 
intimately linked to [religious and belief] attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which 
are aspects of the practice of a religion or a belief in a generally recognised form.”32  This 
approach is mirrored at the UN level where the UN Human rights Committee has interpreted 
identical wording in the corresponding Article 18 of the ICCPR as follows:  
                                                          
30 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at § 48 (1976): "[N]ecessary … is not 
synonymous with ‘indispensible’… neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, 
‘ordinary’, ‘useful’. ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’… [I]t is for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in this context."; 
Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, (2001) 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561 (1999).  
31 Evans, supra note 5, at 105.  
32 C v. UK, App. 10358/83, 47 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 142 (1983). 
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The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression 
to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of 
places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and 
the observance of holidays and days of rest. The observance and practice of religion 
or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the 
observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head 
coverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of 
a particular language customarily spoken by a group. In addition, the practice and 
teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups 
of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and 
teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to 
prepare and distribute religious texts or publications. 33   
In recent times, however, the European Court has adopted a more expansive approach 
towards identifying acts that should be recognised as “manifestations” for the purposes of 
Articled 9: “the existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the 
underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no 
requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated 
by the religion in question.”34 
This more permissive approach to determining a protected manifestation may be 
welcomed as an indication of the Court’s willingness to accept that a person’s religion or 
beliefs may lead them to believe that they are required to act in a certain manner in many 
spheres of their life. However, it brings with it added complexity for the application of 
Article 9. It is suggested here that to understand the nature of the challenges posed, it is 
useful to subdivide the claims arising under “Religion as a Way of Life” facet into two: 
“Religion as Expected Conduct” and “Religion as a Moral Informant.” 
                                                          
33 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Art. 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), 
para. 4 (forty-eighth session, 1993), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993), adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994). 
34 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, App. 27417/95, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, para. 73 (2000). 
Commented [A1]:  :מקור מאומת, קישור 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom22.htm 
Commented [A2R1]:  
17 
 
Claims arising under “Religion as Expected Conduct” are concerned with protection 
for conventional—though not necessarily mandatory—actions and behaviour related to the 
systems of belief of the claimant. These may include, for example, the right to assemble for 
collective worship, the right to wear particular items of clothing, the right not to perform 
military service, and the right to observe days of rest and holidays.35  The task of the Court in 
dealing with these claims is to assess whether restrictions placed on such manifestations are 
justifiable under the limitations set out in Article 9(2). In this task the Court is not called upon 
to examine the substance of the underlying belief system that has prompted the manifestation 
but rather to look at whether the restrictions placed on the conduct are “necessary in a 
democratic society.”36  In short, the approach of the Court is to examine whether the conduct 
ought to be protected, not whether the belief is worthy of protection.  
“Religion as Expected Conduct” encompasses many of the interests that sought legal 
protection through the centuries, for example, the liberties that were assumed to be protected 
through the specific clauses of the minority treaties, such as those dealing with education, 
language use and protecting the Sabbath. It also embraces the concerns of early collective 
claims of conscience that were granted national protection in the seventeenth-century. These 
claims relate to the right not to be forced to hold or to worship unwanted truths or doctrines—
claims that originate in the “Religion as Belief” facet but, as noted above, are typically 
treated as passive manifestations under the scheme of protection developed under Article 9.  
The second sub-facet, “Religion as a Moral Informant,” is concerned with the desire 
of an individual to act in a manner consistent with moral convictions that they derive from 
their religion but which are not directly related with truth claims (the subject matter of the 
first facet, “Religion as Truth”) nor derived from the expected conduct of that religion. At 
                                                          
35See, e.g. Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2005); Stedman v U.K., 23 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 168 (1997); Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).  
36 ECHR, arts. 8,9, 10, supra note 2.  
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times, these convictions may require an individual to refuse to act in a way required by law. 
For example, they may motivate a doctor to refuse to carry out an abortion or a pharmacist to 
refuse to distribute contraceptives or a hotel owner to refuse to accommodate same sex 
couples. For many, an inability to live life in accordance with such convictions can 
substantially impinge upon their enjoyment of religious freedom. 
Historically, claims relating to “Religion as a Moral Informant”—referred to above as 
claims of religious morality—were not explicitly treated in international approaches to the 
regulation of religious freedom. At the national level, claims for exemptions from national 
laws of general applicability have originated from this facet. For example, in England and 
Wales, legal exemptions on grounds of religion and belief were made available to 
compulsory medical treatment in 1898.37  However, at the level of international human rights 
law such claims pose a two-fold challenge for an individual formulation of the right to 
religious freedom.  
First, should claims of religious morality be recognised as a protected form of 
manifestation under Article 9? If the permitted modes of manifestation—worship, teaching, 
practice, observance—are read strictly and in line with international guidance, it seems 
unlikely that claims of morality would fall within the notion of an acceptable manifestation.38  
However, as already noted, the Court has increasingly taken a liberal approach in recognising 
a wide range of manifestations.39  This has been justified as a means of removing the Court 
from deliberations as to whether a particular manifestation is a mandatory act of a particular 
religion or belief and, additionally, has allowed for recognition of the fact that many aspects 
of “Religion as a Way of Life” are central to people’s lives. However, arguably this 
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expansive approach should be limited to claims arising from “Religion as Expected Conduct” 
and not extended as far as admitting manifestations under “Religion as a Moral Informant.”  
These latter claims may be more appropriately conceptualised as claims arising from one’s 
conscience. If this were to be the case then they would not receive protection under the 
scheme of Article 9 for as Malcolm Evans notes:  
[T]he second sentence of Article 9 only relates to the manifestation of a religion or 
belief and not to the manifestation of patterns of thought or conscience, which are 
covered by the general right to freedom of expression found in Article 10 of the 
Convention.40  
Despite these reservations, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
shows that claims of religious morality have been deemed admissible.41 Unlike claims 
originating under the “Religion as Truth” facet, these claims cannot expect to receive 
absolute protection for they involve the manifestation of a religion and belief and no legal 
system would afford an absolute right to act on such a basis. To determine whether denying 
the exercise of a manifestation of this type is a violation of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief, the Court is forced into considering the impact of the manifestation on the rights of 
others and on society more broadly. And this, in turn, leads to consideration of the second 
challenge: how should the Court proceed with the balancing act between permitting 
manifestations of religious morality and protecting public safety, public order, health, morals, 
and the rights of others? 
While the same challenge faces consideration of manifestations arising from 
“Religion as Expected Conduct,” those associated with “Religion as a Moral Informant” 
generate specific concerns, namely, whether the exercise takes the Court into the arena of 
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evaluating beliefs and supporting a particular view of morality. Typically, the Court has 
endeavored to avoid such tasks and, instead, has seen its challenge as assessing the 
appropriateness of protecting the individual and manifestation, rather than the belief. 
However, claims of morality that are based on convictions derived by an individual from 
their religion may by necessity demand that the nature of those convictions—rather than any 
underlying truth claims—are examined in order to reach an assessment of how the 
manifestation relates to others and to “public morality.” Without such an assessment, the 
Court could be seen as too readily accepting, or at least condoning, the morality of the claim, 
rather than instead accommodating the qualified right of an individual to manifest their 
religion in this manner. When claims of religious morality impact upon the provision of 
services, the assessment task becomes further complicated. It raises the argument of whether 
the individual’s claim ought to be accommodated if the service in question can be provided 
by an alternative person or accessed in an alternative venue. This question has the potential of 
further drawing the Court into expressing preferred conceptions of morality as part of the 
process of assessing the appropriateness of accommodating certain convictions in this 
manner. 
The next section aims to illustrate these issues and challenges through an examination of 
a recent judgement from the European Court of Human Rights that dealt with claims for 
religious accommodation related to both aspects of the “Religion as a Way of Life” facet: 
“Religion as Expected Conduct” and “Religion as a Moral Informant.” This examination 
reaches the conclusion that the treatment of claims deriving from “Religion as a Moral 
Informant” poses a particular risk for the Article 9 as well as the integrity of human rights 
law more generally. 




In January 2013 the European Court of Human Rights handed down its much-anticipated 
judgment in Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom.42  The case examined four separate 
complaints from Christian employees whose rights to manifest their religion as guaranteed in 
the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated by their employers. All the 
complaints may be said to be related to the facet of “Religion as a Way of Life,” with two 
falling within “Religion as Expected Conduct” and the other two related to “Religion as a 
Moral Informant.” 
Two of the complaints concerned restrictions placed by employers on the wearing of 
religious symbols in the workplace. Ms. Eweida, a check-in clerk, wanted to wear a visible 
cross on a chain in contravention of British Airways’ uniform policy. Ms. Chaplin, a nurse, 
refused to stop wearing a crucifix contrary to her employer’s health and safety policy. These 
complaints may be considered to flow from an understanding of “Religion as Expected 
Conduct” whereby the wearing of distinctive symbols is seen as a manifestation relating to 
the observance and practice of religion. 
The other two complaints have to do with claims of discrimination in and dismissal 
from employment because of a refusal to provide services to homosexuals. Ms. Ladele, a 
registrar, refused to carry out duties relating to the registration of civil partnerships between 
same-sex couples because of her religious objection to same-sex partnerships. Mr. 
McFarlane, a counsellor, regarded homosexual activity as sinful and thus refused to give a 
commitment that he would give psychosexual therapeutic counselling to same-sex couples. 
Complaints of this nature fit within the sub-facet of “Religion as a Moral Informant” whereby 
an individual feels compelled to act in a manner consistent with their convictions that they 
derive from their religion or belief. 
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The Court’s approach in Eweida and Chaplin has been praised for bringing clarity to a 
number of basic points relevant to a consideration of the ambit of religious or belief freedom. 
First, the Court noted that if provided “views” seeking Article 9 protection attain “a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,” then it was incompatible with the 
state’s duty of neutrality for it to “assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way those 
beliefs are expressed.”43  While it did note that there needed to exist a “sufficiently close and 
direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief,” it recognized that such a nexus must 
be determined on the facts of each case and, moreover, “there is no requirement on the 
applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in 
question.”44  Thus, as Peroni notes, an advantage of this approach is, “that it leaves more 
room for recognizing minorities within religions, whose practices might not be generally 
recognized or considered as required by the religion in question.”45   
Second, the Court took the opportunity to distance itself from what had become 
known as the “freedom to resign” doctrine, a feature of Strasbourg’s previous approach to 
freedom of religion cases in the workplace.46 In brief, this doctrine had indicated that if a 
person could avoid the alleged interference with religious freedom through, for example, 
resigning from her job, then there could be no question of an interference with religious 
freedom. In Eweida, the Court noted that this option would no longer be a determining factor: 
[R]ather than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any 
interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in 
                                                          
43 Id. para. 81. 
44 Id. para. 82.  
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the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was 
proportionate.47 
Having recognized that Eweida’s desire to wear a cross was a manifestation of her 
religion under Article 9(1), the Court proceeded to examine whether preventing her from 
doing so could be justified under Article 9(2). Here the Court ought to have considered 
whether the restriction was imposed to protect one of the legitimate aims found in 9(2), 
namely: public safety, public order, health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. 
However, in place of such a consideration, it readily accepted the aim of the interference as 
being one of allowing British Airways “to communicate a certain image of the company and 
to promote recognition of its brand and staff.”48 It then conducted a superficial 
proportionality exercise where it concluded that “while this aim was undoubtedly legitimate, 
the domestic courts accorded it too much weight. Ms Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot 
have detracted from her professional appearance.”49  The Court concluded there had been a 
violation of Eweida’s rights under Article 9. 
In contrast to this unconvincing approach, the Court is on surer ground in reaching its 
conclusion in the case of Chaplin. Here, in line with the principles set out in Eweida’s case, it 
recognized that Chaplin’s desire to wear a cross at work was a manifestation of her religious 
belief and that a refusal to allow her to do so was an interference with that right. The Court 
then looked at the legitimate ground for restricting this manifestation—public health and 
safety. A cross on a chain might be pulled by a patient thereby injuring the patient or Chaplin, 
and it may also cause infection by coming into contact with an open wound.50  The Court 
therefore concluded that protecting the health and safety of nurses and patients justified the 
interference with Chaplin’s right to wear a cross on the ward. It felt compelled to add that, 
                                                          
47 Eweida, supra note 36, at para 83. 
48 Id., para. 93. 
49 Id.,  para. 94. 
50 Id., para. 98. 
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“Moreover, this is a field where the domestic authorities must be allowed a wide margin of 
appreciation. The hospital managers were better placed to make decision about clinical safety 
than a court, particularly an international court which has heard no direct evidence.”51 It is 
unclear why a reference to the principle of margin of appreciation was deemed necessary 
given that the Court had reached its own reasoned conclusion based on its case law. 
The approach of the Court to these two cases involving claims related to “Religion as 
Expected Conduct” suggests a methodology that will not question the substantive content of 
the beliefs involved nor whether the manifestation is one mandated by the religion in 
question. Rather, the focus in on Article 9(2) and whether the restriction is imposed for a 
legitimate aim in a manner that is proportionate. While the discussion above suggests that the 
Court’s application of the approach is less than satisfactory in the case of Eweida, overall it 
indicates that claims for religious accommodation of this nature ought to receive a fuller 
hearing than under previous procedures. As Mark Hill puts it: 
No longer will it be open to defendants to seek a ‘knockout blow’ by challenging the 
authenticity of the belief or whether its outward manifestation is doctrinally mandated 
or by demonstrating that resignation from a particular job would allow the individual 
the uninhibited practice of his or her religion .52 
A similar approach can be discerned in the “Religion as a Moral Informant” cases 
dealt with in the Eweida judgment: Ladele and McFarlane. The analysis below focuses on 
Ladele given that the facts of this case bring to the fore the range of the concerns highlighted 
in Part II, that is, a claim of morality within the context of service provision.  
Ladele complained that the decision of her employer not to make accommodation for 
her on account of her objection to same-sex partnerships amounted to breach of Article 14 
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(right to non-discrimination) of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9. The 
Court stated that in its view “it is clear that the applicant’s objection to participating in the 
creation of same-sex partnerships was directly motivated by her religious beliefs.”  It then 
moved on swiftly to conclude that the “events in question fell within the ambit of Article 
9.”53  Thus, having recognized Ladele’s objection as a manifestation of her religion, the Court 
readily accepted that it should be considered as a protected manifestation falling within the 
scope of Article 9, that is, it accepted that her action was connected to an expression of the 
worship, teaching, practice or observance of her religion within the meaning of Article 9. It 
did not pause to consider whether, in contrast to manifestations related to the ‘Religion as 
Expected Conduct’ facet, Ladele’s objection—being derived from the “religion as a moral 
informant” facet of religion’—would be better viewed as a manifestation of her conscience 
on the issue of same-sex couple partnerships, a manifestation that would not have gained the 
protection of Article 9. 
It is worth noting that the issue of conscience was raised in the Ladele case but in a 
highly confused manner in the partly dissenting opinion written by judges Vuvinic and De 
Gaetano. The judges here contended that Ladele’s claim should be considered as a “case of 
conscientious objection,” which they argued could not be subjected to restrictions: 
We are of the view that once a genuine and serious case of conscientious objection is 
established, the State is obliged to respect the individual’s freedom of conscience…. 
No balancing exercise can, therefore, be carried out between the third applicant’s 
concrete right to conscientious objection, which is one of the most fundamental rights 
inherent in the human person—a right which is not given by the Convention but is 
recognised and protected by it—and a legitimate State or public authority which seeks 
to protect rights in the abstract. As a consequence, the Court was not called upon to 
determine whether the means used to pursue this aim was proportionate.54  
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To frame Ladele’s claim in this manner is to fundamentally misunderstand the scheme 
of protection under Article 9 and to confuse “Religion as Truth” claims with claims 
belonging to “Religion as a Way of Life.” As noted above, the right to freedom of conscience 
as found in the human right to religious and belief freedom is a right to not to be forced to 
hold unwanted beliefs. It is an absolute right. By contrast, the manifestation of beliefs—
whatever the source of those beliefs—is a right that should always be subject to scrutiny.  
Returning to the majority judgement, the Court, having accepted that Ms Ladele’s 
objection fell within the scope of Article 9, had to now consider whether the policy pursued a 
legitimate aim and was proportionate. The policy in question concerned the local authority’s 
approach to its task of registering civil partnerships. The aim of this policy was to deliver a 
service that complied with its Dignity for All policy, which committed the local authority to 
“the promotion of equal opportunities and to requiring all its employees to act in a way which 
does not discriminate against others.”55  It also aimed to deliver a service that was effective in 
terms of practicality and efficiency. The Court accepted the policy had a legitimate aim and 
proceeded to consider the proportionality of the means used to pursue this aim. In other 
words, did this aim justify the interference with Ladele’s right to manifest her beliefs under 
Article 9 and was the interference proportionate to achieving that aim?  It noted that: 
The consequences for the applicant were serious; given the strength of her religious 
conviction, she considered that she had no choice but to face disciplinary action rather 
than be designated a civil partnership registrar and, ultimately, she lost her job…On 
the other hand, however, the local authority’s policy aimed to secure the rights of 
others which are also protected under the Convention.56  
However, in place of a discussion of the proportionality of these issues, the Court then 
relied on the principle of the margin of appreciation as follows: 
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The Court generally allows the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation 
when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights… [t]he 
Court does not consider that the national authorities, that is the local authority 
employer which brought the disciplinary proceedings and also the domestic courts 
which rejected the applicant’s discrimination claim, exceeded the margin of 
appreciation available to them. It cannot, therefore, be said that there had been a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 in respect of the third 
applicant.57 
The nature of the Court’s approach to the issues in Ladele reveals the complex 
concerns that arise when “the rights and freedoms of others” is cited as the legitimate aim or 
ground for an interference with a manifestation relating to “Religion as a Moral Informant.”  
The problem is two-fold. First, there must be evidence that a person’s right has been or risks 
being harmed; the mere causing of offence is not considered sufficient.58  As Judge Tulkens 
has said: “Only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt—not mere 
worries or fears—are capable of satisfying that requirement and justifying interference with a 
right guaranteed by the Convention…[m]ere affirmations do not suffice; they must be 
supported by concrete examples.”59  The reality with claims based on “Religion as a Moral 
Informant” is that very often they involve providing a service and this service can, at times, 
be delivered by any number of people. It is therefore possible to avoid causing—and hence 
difficult to prove—actual or potential harm to an individual.   
This issue is at the heart of the Ladele case and other similar “Religion as a Moral 
Informant” cases: what would have been the nature of the harm if Ms Ladele had been 
accommodated in a manner which would have allowed her to avoid civil partnership duties?  
Does the harm equate to the fact that a same-sex couple might be denied the right to a civil 
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partnership?  Or, is the harm not the denial of a service but rather the display of 
discrimination against a group in society on a ground that is protected against such 
discrimination in national and international equality and human rights law?  If the former, 
then acting to provide an alternative registrar as required for conducting same-sex couples 
partnerships would protect against this harm. However, if the latter is the case then it 
becomes difficult to see how the interpretation of the “protection of rights of others” ground, 
as articulated by Judge Tulkens above, has relevance to such cases. That being so, the 
remaining other legitimate aim or ground for justification for the interference of Ms Ladele’s 
right becomes “public morality.” 
The second difficulty in examining the question of interference on the ground of  
“rights and freedoms of others” in claims related to “Religion as a Moral Informant” is 
intrinsically linked to the first; if the question of harm is not addressed, then it becomes 
impossible to assess whether protecting against this harm is a proportionate act and therefore 
a legitimate interference with the claimant’s right to freedom of religion or belief. In Ladele, 
the Court avoided a discussion of these issues as well as a potential alternative assessment on 
the grounds of public morals through taking recourse to the principle of margin of 
appreciation.60  The result was a judgment that avoided any balancing act between 
interference and aims, and which has subsequently been criticized for its lack of moral 
reasoning and insight: 
 [The judgement’s] complete lack of reasoning in respect of proportionality and its 
reliance on the margin of appreciation doctrine makes it problematic. It is problematic 
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because the ECtHR can (and regularly does) take the same approach in order to reject 
claims from sexual minorities about violations of ECHR rights.61 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: COURTS AND MORALITY 
The accommodation of religious beliefs has been the subject of intense controversy in Europe 
over recent years. The frequency of cases to do with the right to freedom of religion or belief 
coming before the European Court of Human Rights has increased, as have the complexity 
and variety of these claims. A dissection of the complex nature of religion freedom into a 
number of facets is necessary in order to move towards understanding whether— and how—
such claims should be treated within a contemporary formulation of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief, such as Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Recent case law suggests that claims stemming from the facet of “Religion as a Moral 
Informant” pose the most difficult challenge for the Court, particularly when such claims 
occur within the context of service provision. The “alternative provision” argument in these 
circumstances can appear attractive as a means of avoiding challenging and delicate 
proportionality assessments. To date, the Court has resisted this temptation. However, having 
admitted claims to do with the manifestation of religious morality, its subsequent rush to a 
“margin of appreciation” argument does little to enhance the Court’s role as a regional 
standard-setting body.  
In many ways, when faced with claims of religious morality, the Court finds itself in a 
Catch 22 position—damned if it admits such claims and damned if it does not. If it decides 
that claims to do with the manifestation of religious morality are inadmissible under Article 
9, it may be criticized for failing to take a sufficiently wide understanding of religious liberty 
                                                          




and for failing to offer protection to individuals in important areas of their lives. If the Court 
does admit such claims but relies too heavily on a “margin of appreciation” argument, it is 
open to the accusation of cowardice in the face of the need to demonstrate moral leadership 
and courage. And finally, if it does indeed advance a view on morality in attempting to find a 
balance between the rights of individuals and public morality, it risks being attacked for 
preferring that view of morality over another. 
Historically, and in contrast to the protection afforded against coercion in truth claims, 
claims with respect to the manifestation of religious morality have not received protection in 
international law. When such claims are understood to relate to the “Religion as a Moral 
Informant” facet rather than to “Religion as Expected Conduct” aspect of religion, then the 
scheme of Article 9 does indeed provide a strong argument for judging these claims to be 
inadmissible. Their manifestation does not fall within any of the four categories of 
manifestation set out in the contemporary formulation of the individual right of religion or 
belief. These categories are designed to capture those activities (whether doctrinally 
mandated or not) that are related to the “Religion as Expected Conduct” facet of religion and 
should be read as an exclusive list of permitted manifestations.  
However, cases such as Ewieda demonstrate that the European Court has been willing 
to admit claims to do with the manifestation of religious morality within the context of 
service provision. In taking this position, it has to recognize that it has set itself an arduous 
and hazardous task for it must then be prepared to engage in hard choices in relation to 
morality. The rights and freedoms of others cannot provide the appropriate ground to assess 
the proportionality of an interference with a manifestation of this kind. The most apt ground 
on which to make this assessment will very frequently be that of public morals. However, and 
unsurprisingly, the judicial process is ill-fitted to make difficult decisions on religion and 
morality. This is all the more so when it is an international, rather than national, court that is 
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charged with performing such an assessment—a task that the majority of the European Court 
of Human Rights was not prepared to carry out in the Ladele case.  
The price to pay for such evasion is high. At one level, an unwillingness to confront the 
challenge means that a nuanced consideration of the issues does not take place. As a 
consequence, little guidance is thus made available to those decision-makers who are faced 
with questions of legal accommodation on a regular basis. At another, deeper level, the 
avoidance of the question risks bringing the Court and its authority into disrepute. Richard 
Moon has noted, in relation to the state, that if a state is to take meaningful action, it must 
prefer some values or moral judgements over others.62 Similarly, if the Convention and Court 
aims to maintain its position as a protector of Europe’s human rights, it has to be prepared to 
engage with morality if it chooses to admit claims stemming from the “religion as a moral 
informant” facet of religious freedom. This is not to say that an agreed and stable morality, 
and a proper foundation for legislation can be found in the concept of human rights.63  Rather, 
it forces the Court to refer to, and draw more fully on, its founding principles and to be wary 
of allowing morality and law to point in opposite directions.64 Any future reluctance to do so 
must surely force the Court into undertaking a fundamental and defining consideration as to 
whether or not manifestations of claims of religious morality should fall inside the scope of 
the right to religious freedom in international human rights law. 
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